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may have effects not only on their own welfare, but may impose "external" effects on other nations. Some of these externalities have "positive" effects, for example, the banning of fluorocarbons (slowing the depletion of ozone) and the adoption of an immunization program, or they may impose "negative" effects, such as environmental pollution, the spurring of illegal immigration by mismanagement of the economy, and arms races and wars. These negative externalities reduce the level of welfare of the affected countries and require the diversion of resources toward their elimination.
In the next two sections, we present the formal model and derive a geometric representation of the problem. In the fourth section, we do some comparative analysis on the issue of military spending and highlight some important features of conflict situations. The final section presents a summary of the results and concludes with ideas for future research. It should be stated that this article is an attempt at integrating the arms race modeling literature (in a static optimizing sense) as exemplified (in a dynamic game setting) by Lambelet (1973) , Chatterjee (1974) , and Brito and Intrilligator (1977) , with the expected utility approach (Wittman, 1979 ; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). The two-state approach to the problem is similar to that adopted in a recent article by Brito and Intrilligator (1985) .
MODEL
This article builds on a model developed by Connolly (1970) to analyze international public goods. For simplicity, assume a twocountry world. Both countries produce a private good, Y1, and a public good, Mi, which we shall call military capability, where i = 1, 2. Assume that there are two factors of production, capital and labor. Furthermore, assume that these factors are fully employed in each country, so that total sectoral use is equal to their endowed supply, that is, 
Mi = G (KM' ,LM) LM gi (41
In addition, assume that there exists perfect competition among firms, both sectorally and cross-sectorally. If we assume that the military sector is more capital intensive, we can derive from the above, concave production possibility curves (PPC) for each country, Hi(M, Yi ) = 0.
[5]
The amount of military capability produced by a nation is not necessarily equal to the amount available for its consumption. Some proportion of Country 2's military capability has a "spillover" effect on the effectiveness of Country l's military defense. Denote this proportion a12. Likewise, some proportion of Country l's military capability has a spillover effect on the effectiveness of Country 2's military capability. In the same manner, denote this proportion a21. If we represent the total amount of spillover from Country 2 to Country 1 as M12, then the total consumption of military capability or national security by Country 1 is m1 = M -M12 [61 where ml represents the total amount consumed and M1 the total amount produced by Country 1. It is important to note that if these two countries are hostile to each other, M12 > 0 and if they are allies, M12 < 0. Since we are interested in analyzing the case of two countries hostile to each other, we assume that M12 > 0. The reason that this amount is subtracted from the total production of M is that, for any given level of military capability a country may possess, an increase in the amount of military capability of another hostile country will lead to a decline in the "effective" amount available for consumption. For example, if military hardware and personnel were solely employed for defensive purposes in Country 1, an increase in a potential adversary's military capability would lead to a fall in the former's "effective" defense capability. In other words, it reduces national security.2 By our previous assumption,
M12 a12 M2 [7]
where M2 is the total amount of M produced by Country 2 and therefore some fraction of that total reduces the effectiveness of Country l's military capability.3 Therefore the total effective consumption of M for Country 1, ml, is equal to:
Likewise, for Country 2 m2 M2 a21 MI [9
In our model, the coefficient, aj, can be viewed as a "coefficient of aggression." As such, it reflects the perception of threat or hostility from other nations toward Country i. In our analysis, it is exogenously determined in one of two ways. It can be seen as the solution to the problem faced by defense policy analysts in determining the "intent" of an adversary. This is equivalent to evaluating the appropriate value of aij. Conversely, it can be considered as the equilibrium outcome of a "public choice" problem in which different groups in society have different values of aj and therefore each policy alternative has political repercussions for elected officials or bureaucracies. In fact, the political 2. As discussed later in the article, there is a negative relationship between Ml and the probability an aggressor will attack. This is the deterrent effect of M. Another possibility may be that the actual amount of hardware (adjusted for quality) cannot be fully verified or counted. This latter example characterizes one of the main arguments used to oppose the SALT concept, that is, given the Soviet's refusal for "on-sight" inspection of their nuclear arsenal, any "contract" to freeze present levels cannot be fully monitored. In fact, not only will there exist strong incentives to cheat on the agreement, but also there exists a bias towards quality (R&D) versus quantity due to the high monitoring cost, and therefore a lower probability of detection of the former form of expenditure. Generally, the nature of the problem in this area of international relations lends itself to analysis by employing the economic theories developed to analyze industrial structures.
With respect to our model, the form we use to characterize the uncertainty and the assumption about the country's attitude towards risk affects the ultimate solution to the problem. In addition, investments by countries to improve their monitoring (verifying) capability 9. Same argument as in the previous note, in which, instead of free disposal, we assume the country has the option of not adopting the new technology. In conclusion, if we assume countries can be characterized by riskaversion as represented, for example, by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, then the levels of military expenditures are higher in a world where full verification is costly, than in one where a "benevolent" world organization possessed knowledge of the actual levels and disclosed this information. Therefore, the failure to develop international institutions that are capable of internalizing the externalities that result from international interactions can lead to the outbreak of war. We begin by presenting a simple exposition of the conditions that may lead to the outbreak of war. In the discussion that follows, assume that no voluntary redistribution of resources is possible. This implies that the sufficient conditions we will derive for a credible threat of war are equivalent to sufficient conditions for the outbreak of war. Assume that Countries 1 and 2 are in equilibrium, as shown in Figure 5 . Consumption equilibrium for Country 1 is at the levels of (ml, yl) given by Cl and likewise for Country 2 at C'. Furthermore, assume that Country 1 knows for certain that if it engages Country 2 in a military conflict it will win, but at the cost of destroying some fraction of its economy-wide resources. This proportion of loss is a function of the effective military capability of Country 1 relative to its adversary. A "win" implies that Country 1 destroys some fraction of its opponent's military capability, but more importantly it lowers the coefficient of aggression to zero by negotiating for a regime not hostile to it. In other words, a victory implies the loser is no longer an aggressor. Another possible motive for intervention in our model would be for a forced transfer of property rights from the loser to the victor. In this scenario, Country 1 would confiscate a portion of the resources of Country 2 as a spoil of war. In effect, this shifts the PPC of Country 1 outwards. This latter motive is the one assumed by Brito and Intrilligator (1985) , in which they define war to be the use of weapons to effect an involuntary redistribution of resources.
If we assume risk-neutral preferences, the issue of whether intervention is perceived as optimal by a country is simple in this example. If the indifference curve, WI, tangent to the expected transformation curve after war is above W', then intervention is welfare improving. On the other hand, if WI is below W7, then the initial allocation is optimal. In Figure 5 , the expected transformation curve after war is labeled A'AI and as can be seen, expected welfare is higher after a conflict. The difference between A'A' and A11A' (now equal to CPC since aj = 0), measures the amount of resources expected to be destroyed as a result of intervention. In the case where both opponents have nuclear weapons, neither has first-strike capability, and the fraction of resources expected to be destroyed in both nations approaches one, engagement in a nuclear war is not optimal. This is equivalent to being located in what From the simple example above, we can see that the decision problem is a two-stage game. The first stage of the process is to choose the levels of Mi, Yi that are socially optimal and, assuming a Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation of {(m*, yr), (mj*, yj*)}, the second stage requires choosing whether to enter into a conflict based on the first-stage's equilibrium outcome. If instead we modelled the problem as a two-stage perfect equilibrium game, we would proceed as follows: First, solve the second-stage decision of whether to enter into a conflict or not conditional on the first-stage's choice having been made in an optimal fashion. This will result in a payoff function for the second stage that looks like a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Second, insert this payoff function into the first-stage's objective function and solve for the optimal values of Mi, Yi. Brito and Intrilligator (1985) recently approached the problem in a similar manner. We will take the former approach and solve the problem sequentially.
Since we have already solved the first-stage decision, let us proceed to discuss the second-stage one. We begin by noting that if Country i wins a conflict, it can achieve a lowering of at We assume there exists a distribution of possible outcomes for aj in both the case of a victory or a defeat. Let Xi denote a random variable of possible outcomes of a conflict involving Country i and xi denote the realized value of Xi. We can define Xi to be continuous, but for simplicity, assume that xi 1 if Country i is victorious in a conflict and xi = 0 if it is defeated. Let zi(aij I xi = 1) denote the probability density function of aij conditional on Country i winning the conflict, and zi(aij I xi = 0) the distribution function conditional on a defeat of i. Note also that there exists the possibility that in either outcome the realized value for aj may be negative, that is, the other country goes from an adversary to an ally. If we denote Pi as the probability that xi = 1 and qi as the probability that xi = 0 (with pi + qi = 1), then we can define the distribution function for aj as follows:
Pi(a ij =zi(aij l xi = )Pi + z i(aiJ xi ?O)qi.
[21]
Likewise, we define a conditional probability distribution function for the capital and labor that will remain in each country after the end of the conflict. These amounts of resources may include the augmenting of "own" resources through the confiscation of capital and labor from the loser, or losing resources beyond those destroyed in war as a "payment" to the victor. We denote the conditional probability density function for the capital and labor remaining in Country i, Ki and Li as, hi(Ki I xi = 1) and hi(Ki I xi = 0) and likewise for labor. These define conditional distributions for the country's production possibilities under the two possible outcomes. First of all, we could generalize the above by introducing the possibility of redistribution or side-payments. For example, suppose that EWi < Wi but EWj > Wj, then there may exist some Pareto-improving allocation of resources that prevents a war. In other words, there may exist the possibility that Country i can transfer resources to Country j and leave both countries better off than had they entered into a war. War will then occur and be initiated by Country j when EWj > Wj and there exists no possible redistribution of resources from i to j such that i is still at least as well off and j is better off than if it entered into war (see, e.g., Wittman, 1979; Brito and Intrilligator, 1985) .
Second, note that the same type of analysis can be used to study the effects of goods externalities as well as military externalities, for example, pollution effects, trade interdependencies, and so forth, where the maximand now become 
